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Abstract
The idea of a middle-income trap is now over a decade old and continues to be applied 
to growth paths which have not been self-sustaining. With the bulk of emerging markets 
now approaching middle-income status, and given the reality of slower growth for many 
countries (and the policy recommendations that currently exist for overcoming this prob-
lem), is the middle-income trap still a relevant framework? Using reference to the BRICS 
countries, the key finding of this analysis is that the middle-income trap conceptualization 
is of little value-added, as fundamentals still matter, especially in relation to macroeco-
nomic stability. Similarly, we note that “quality” institutions are necessary, both political 
and economic, including (smaller) size of government and property rights. The “trap” as 
currently formulated is thus nothing new or particularly relevant, as it repackages some 
familiar structural issues while avoiding other crucial ones. 
Keywords: middle income trap, growth, BRICS, institutions, total factor productivity.
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1. Introduction
Why some countries grow while others stagnate is perhaps the most important 
question in all of economics, grappled by luminaries such as Adam Smith and 
David Hume and still a relevant research topic today. Part of the allure of this ques-
tion comes from the continuing challenge of countries to attain economic growth, 
as well as the fact that the path to growth appears to change: the faces of success 
are different around the world, from the glittering skyscrapers of Hong Kong to 
the larger-than-life appearance of New York and Moscow, the spread-out environs 
of Los Angeles, and the restrained wealth of Hamburg. However, the faces of eco-
nomic failure are only too similar: shantytowns on the outskirts of Dhaka could 
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be mistaken for favelas in Brazil but for the people inside, and small earthen com-
pounds found in rural Afghanistan could just as easily be placed in rural East Africa. 
The fact that poverty, in all its similarity, persists in some regions of the world 
continues to be a paradox given the experience of the world over the past 50 years. 
Over this timespan, global growth by any metric has been the rule, not the excep-
tion, with currency, debt, and even global financial crises only briefly interrupting 
an upward trajectory (Fig. 1). There are few places in the world where quality of 
life was not better in 2016 than in 1960 even if, as Fig. 2 shows, the growth has 
not been evenly distributed, with certain regions showing incredible success and 
others stagnating. 
The key to this paradox may be that the global growth shown in Fig. 1 masks 
the fact that growth paths have not been self-sustaining in many countries, with 
plateau effects after attaining certain thresholds of per capita income. This phe-
nomenon has been observed in nearly every region of the world and at every in-
come level, with even countries that had reached a standard of living above sub-
Fig. 1. World GDP per capita, 1970–2016 (constant 2010 US$).
Source: World Bank. World Development Indicators.
Fig. 2. World GDP per capita by region, 1970–2016.
Source: World Bank. World Development Indicators.
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sistence finding difficulties in raising it further. Indeed, this “start-stop” growth 
has been the real story in economic development over the past two decades; re-
searchers from the World Bank have dubbed this problem of fading growth for 
middle-income countries exclusively “the middle-income trap,” to distinguish it 
from “the poverty trap” that afflicts poorer countries (Gill and Kharas, 2007). 
The middle-income trap (hereafter MIT) has been defined precisely as this 
slowdown in growth which occur once countries reach middle-income levels. 
In the words of the World Bank, “after exceeding the poverty trap of US$1,000 
GDP per capita, many emerging market countries head rapidly to the ‘take-off 
stage’ of US$3,000 per capita GDP [b]ut as they near this figure… they experi-
ence long-term economic stagnation, divisions between rich and poor become 
serious, corruption is rampant, and they fall into the ‘trap.’”1 This convention has 
been picked up by others to utilize the boundaries of the trap: As long as a country 
stays in the middle-income category, all the way from a GNI per capita of $1,006 
to $12,235 (the 2016 boundaries), it is presumed to have reached middle-income, 
and it is only when a country exceeds this threshold and becomes “high-income” 
that it is considered to have “escaped” the middle-income trap.2 
The MIT literature, with the benefit of slightly over ten years of work, has made 
heavy reference to Latin America’s experience in the 1980s in the bulk of em-
pirical observations, but other recent work has focused on the specific problem 
of growth slowdowns from (formerly) high-performing countries such the Baltic 
States (Staehr, 2015) or the role of the middle-class (Ozturk, 2016) or technology in 
escaping it (Vivarelli, 2016). Indeed, the MIT is perhaps more interesting because 
so few countries have escaped it: Of “101 middle-income economies in 1960, only 
13 became high-income by 2008 — Equatorial Guinea, Greece, Hong Kong SAR 
(China), Ireland, Israel, Japan, Mauritius, Portugal, Puerto Rico, the Republic 
of Korea, Singapore, Spain, and Taiwan” (World Bank, 2012, p. 12). The vast 
experience outside of this select group was of stagnation, with Latin America, 
for instance, seeing “income per capita relative to the United States [falling] al-
most continuously from 1960 to 2005, especially after the debt crises of the early 
1980s” (Agénor et al., 2012, p. 1). According to Gill and Kharas (2007, p. 53), 
the economists credited with coining the phrase “middle-income trap,” the only 
“part of the world that has most notably defied this tendency is East Asia.”
The policy prescriptions offered in support of breaking out of the “trap” have 
also varied according to the region and/or the institution doing the examination, 
although much research has tended towards recommending “strategic, proac-
tive and coherent government policies for the advancement of social and firm-
level capabilities” (Paus, 2012, p. 118). This has been echoed by research from 
the World Bank that attempts to identify a framework that can “guide policy mak-
ers on how to identify new industries consistent with a country’s latent compara-
tive advantage”; this research also notes that government must play an active role 
in facilitating industrial upgrading and infrastructure improvements (Lin, 2012).
In relation to the BRICS countries of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South 
Africa, the middle-income trap and its policy prescriptions have taken on extra 
1 The World Bank. How we classify countries, http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-classifications
2 Of course, these cutoffs are not static, as the frontier is always moving forward, and prices are changing. These 
definitions are based on 2016 development levels, which will naturally become less relevant in the future.
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importance of late as growth slowdowns have become more persistent across 
these countries. Not surprisingly, China, as the biggest economy by far of 
the grouping, has been the prime target of investigation in relation to the MIT, 
with many authors attempting to attribute China’s recent slowdown (and pros-
pect of future slowdowns) to the conditions associated with the trap (see Cai, 
2012; Eichengreen et al., 2012; Zhang et al., 2013; Huang, 2016; and Bulman 
et al., 2017). Indeed, China has pushed out Latin America as the new focus for 
the middle-income trap literature, with papers such as Eichengreen et al. (2012) 
pointing out the human capital gap which China possesses and recommending 
larger and better-targeted government spending. 
Given the experience of China and the reality facing the rest of the BRICS, 
the purpose of this paper is to examine both the conceptual underpinnings of 
the middle-income trap and its policy prescriptions in relation to the BRICS coun-
tries. This analysis casts a critical eye towards the idea of a middle- income trap as 
a new or even useful concept in international development; using case studies from 
the BRICS countries themselves, I show instead that the effects commonly attrib-
uted to the MIT are nothing more than old wine in new bottles, predicted by stan-
dard growth and economic theory. More importantly, these issues do not require 
innovative or “new structural” approaches to overcome them, but a reliance on 
two simple fundamentals: prudent macroeconomic policy and fostering effective 
economic institutions. Indeed, the danger of the MIT literature is that it purports to 
offer countries a way to leap-frog these pre-requisites (Doner and Schneider, 2016). 
Examining these two dimensions in the context of the BRICS countries, we will be 
able to distill effective recommendations for policymakers to avoid the MIT.
2. What is wrong with the middle-income trap: Policy failings are  
not new
2.1. A brief look at the concept
The term “middle-income trap” is attributed to economists Indermitt Gill 
and Homi Kharas, which began as an empirical observation in a publication for 
the World Bank in 2007 examining the differing growth paths in East Asia in 
the 1990s (Gil and Kharas, 2007). Their work, focusing on the “East Asian re-
naissance,” compared the growth record of East Asian countries with those in 
Europe and Latin America and noted that:
“During the last 50 years, many countries have moved from levels of income 
that are associated with abject poverty to levels that have earned them mid-
dle-income status. But, during this time, outside of Europe, only a handful 
have gone from low-income to high-income status. The part of the world that 
has been most disappointing is Latin America, where many countries reached 
middle-income levels and then, essentially, stopped growing. And the part of 
the world that has most notably defied this tendency is East Asia” (Gil and 
Kharas, 2007, p. 53).
Gil and Kharas (2009, p. 199) subsequently refined this observation, reaffirm-
ing that “few countries manage to achieve high levels of sustained growth for 
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over a generation and even fewer of these countries continue their high growth 
rates once they reach middle income.” Attributing the slowdown in growth to 
a dissipation of cost advantages in labor-intensive sectors, coupled with a lack of 
government reach in infrastructure and basic sanitation, they claimed that there 
was ample empirical evidence from the past 50 years to show that countries did 
indeed become ensnared in a “middle income trap”.
Since these seminal articles, the literature on MIT has grown and the phrase 
itself has entered the lexicon of economic growth. Of course, reaching middle-
income status by itself is not enough to be “trapped,” and in fact is a more wel-
come development than the alternative of grinding poverty and subsistence 
living . Thus, as a further step, Felipe et al. (2012) calculated what was necessary 
for a country to become high-income; their paper showed that a country that 
becomes lower-middle-income has to attain an average growth rate of per capita 
income of at least 4.7 per annum to reach upper-middle income, while a country 
that thus attains this level has to show an additional average growth rate of per 
capita income of at least 3.5 percent per annum to graduate to high income. 
Where the “trap” comes in is as Gil and Kharas predicted, where growth rates 
do not equal the “escape velocity” needed to break free of the current level of de-
velopment and grow towards high-income status. Indeed, evidence that has been 
accumulating in the so-called “growth slowdown” literature that these rates of 
growth have generally not been achieved in emerging markets (hence the “trap”), 
and countries that once did grow at a rapid pace have stalled out within the mid-
dle-income band. It is here that much recent research has been devoted to ex-
plaining this phenomenon. Eichengreen et al. (2012, p. 9) examined the conse-
quences of a possible diminishing growth rate in China by examining other recent 
episodes of growth slowdowns, and found that, on average, “high growth came 
to an end at a per capita GDP of $16,740” for countries in their sample, dropping 
from 5.6% per annum to about 2.1%. 
The theorized reason for this slowdown is that poorer countries are character-
ized by a “large pool of unskilled labor” that, as part of a first wave of growth, “is 
transferred from subsistence-level occupations to more modern manufacturing or 
service activities that do not require much upgrading of these workers’ skills, but 
nonetheless employ higher levels of capital and embedded technology,” such as 
heavy industry (Canuto, 2011). Under this conception of growth, poor countries 
are able to utilize existing technologies that have already been created in richer 
countries to aid and abet their own growth. By applying these new technologies 
to the existing stock of labor, a country can gain the advantage of both increasing 
returns for a given level of labor skills without the need for investment in these 
skills to upgrade. This in turn creates a competitive advantage for the country that 
can produce goods at a much lower labor cost.
The catch, however, is that a country may only coast on the developed world’s 
technology for so long. Moreover, this approach carries the seeds of its own de-
mise; assuming that there is a large pool of unskilled labor, once it is drawn into 
medium-skill sectors that are aided by technology, the pool of “surplus” labor 
shrinks rapidly, leading to excess demand, wage growth, and, inevitably, a loss of 
labor-cost competitiveness. Agénor and Canuto (2015) use an overlapping gen-
erations model that focuses on the composition of the labor force itself, showing 
that the same technological forces that drove the initial changes in an economy 
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peter out, along with sustained growth. Modeling the choices of workers to en-
hance their own skill set, constrained by the availability of both basic and ad-
vanced infrastructure (such as broad-band access), the model finds that there are 
several scenarios where an economy can be caught in a low-growth equilibrium. 
Most crucially, where there are “network effects” that require a certain mass of 
people to be in a profession before it can take off (e.g. having the first telephone is 
still quite useless until other people whom you want to talk to also acquire them), 
a country might be caught in a trap where highly educated and skilled work-
ers have talent going to waste because the critical mass hasn’t been reached yet. 
Thus, with no incentive for workers to move into newer fields and/or utilize new 
technology that already might exist, the growth path of the country stagnates. In 
their words, “persistent growth slowdowns coincide with the point in the growth 
process where it is no longer possible to boost productivity by shifting additional 
workers from agriculture to industry and where the gains from importing foreign 
technology diminish significantly” (Agenor and Canuto, 2015, p. 642).
2.2. A critique of the trap part I: Where is the novelty?
The recent focus on the MIT and the corresponding empirical research isolat-
ing its boundaries has highlighted an important phenomenon in the growth of 
nations. However, there still remain many issues with the way the MIT is cur-
rently framed that make this concept somewhat problematic for policymakers. 
The three main issues are:
• Lack of originality. The MIT is not exactly a new concept in economics and 
appears to be a remix of the idea of Solow growth model’s focus on diminish-
ing marginal returns.
• Timing is everything. How and when a country becomes stuck in the MIT ap-
pears to depend entirely upon the eye of the beholder. 
• What about institutions? The MIT literature, while acknowledging that “good 
institutions” are necessary, have been methodologically imprecise on which 
institutions are crucial.
The first, and possibly most damning criticism that can come from an econo-
mist, is that the MIT (at least as encapsulated in the current literature) is perhaps 
not really a new phenomenon. Growth slowdowns are part and parcel of eco-
nomic growth theory (indeed, diminishing marginal returns is the fact underpin-
ning all of economics), as standard growth models predict convergence or a more 
rapid rate of growth from lower income levels to higher incomes that tapers off 
as countries become more prosperous. The basic lessons of the Solow growth 
model as taught to any macroeconomics class and stressed by empirical research 
from the 1990s is that countries converge to their own steady-state and thus have 
normal periods of slow growth (Sala-i-Martin, 1996).
The reason behind this slowdown can also be traced back to diminishing mar-
ginal returns, as accumulation of capital to labor can only take a country so far. 
During the period of increasing accumulation, economic gains can be brilliant, 
but they rarely last in the long run: Eventually there are not enough workers to 
run all the machines. This point, made in the context of the Soviet Union by Paul 
Krugman and in East Asia by Alwyn Young (1995, p. 673) is that “the rise in par-
ticipation rates, investment to GDP ratios, and educational standards and the in-
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tersectoral transfer of labor from agriculture to other sectors (e.g., manufacturing) 
with higher value added per worker” can get a country to a certain level, but then 
it takes technological change to push the frontier even further. 
To be fair, this point has been anticipated by some examining the MIT: 
The World Bank echoed the research of Eichengreen et al. (2012) in noting that 
the evidence of the MIT is based on productivity growth slowdowns. Thus, “85 
percent of the slowdown in the rate of output growth can be explained by a slow-
down in the rate of total factor productivity growth” rather than by “ decreasing 
marginal returns to investment in physical capital, as a simple neoclassical growth 
model would suggest” (Agénor et al., 2012, p. 2). Earlier attempts to quantify 
growth slowdowns from the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) also 
trace the per capita income gap of Latin America on average to one in total factor 
productivity (TFP) growth since the 1970s, while differences in factor accumula-
tion are shown to be less important (Ferreira et al., 2013). This finding confirmed 
work from Solimano and Soto (2004), who showed that productivity trends in 
the region followed a secular decline during the second half of the 20th century, 
reaching an all-time low with the debt crisis in the 1980s. During the years follow-
ing this episode, productivity growth either collapsed or even turned negative. In 
contrast, factor accumulation provided a relatively stable contribution to growth, 
both during expansion and recession years. Indeed, Eichengreen et al. (2012) 
found that the residual of total factor productivity falls from unusually high levels 
of 3 percent plus in periods of high growth to virtually zero in slowdowns, with 
much lower declines corresponding to capital and labor accumulation. 
However, seeing this view of development as different from “decreasing mar-
ginal returns to investment in physical capital” is close to somewhat arbitrarily 
drawing hard-and-fast boundaries that cannot apply in the real world. While ac-
cumulation of technology is necessary, especially for the rapid-growth phase of 
a country, it simply cannot cause growth effects without a corresponding increase 
in capital accumulation. Indeed, the effect noted by researchers above merely 
postulates a reallocation of labor across sectors (generally agriculture to manu-
facturing) coupled with technological advances imported from others, which are 
then supported by capital accumulation to the new techno logy as the source of 
growth (as the endogenous growth model of Romer (1990) would suggest). In 
fact, this viewpoint is exactly the same as standard growth model assumptions: 
Accumulation of capital, in tandem with technology, to a given labor stock in-
creases the productivity of that stock but with diminishing marginal returns to 
both the technology (computers cannot run themselves) and the physical capital 
(even computers in a much bigger room). It is here that the MIT occurs, when 
the marginal returns diminish to zero or near-zero, and another influx of technol-
ogy coupled with labor upgrading (leading to productivity gains) is required. 
If we look beyond the issue of growth accounting, there also are issues within 
the MIT regarding growth stability. Recent economic research has concluded that 
macroeconomic stability is a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for sustained 
economic growth and development.3 While there may be other ingredients in 
3 See the presentation Growth in the Post Crisis World by Stanford professor (and Nobel laureate) Michael 
Spence to the IMF in late 2011. Availble at: http://www.imf.org/external/np/seminars/eng/2011/res/pdf/
MS2presentation.pdf
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the growth elixir, the base of all growth derives from macroeconomic prudence. 
Without this stability, the entire economic environment of a country is in turmoil: 
Expectations are impossible to form in a high inflation environment, resource 
allocation is distorted, investment is dampened, and time-horizons are shortened 
considerably, meaning less long-term savings or planning. Moreover, macroeco-
nomic gyrations translate into growth volatility, which is often more deleteri-
ous than slow growth; boom-bust cycles only add to uncertainty and create “lost 
years” as a country climbs out of repeated recessions instead of maintaining an 
upward growth trajectory. 
This, unfortunately, has been the growth trajectory for many emerging markets 
over the past 50 years (and not a constant climb and then plateau, as the MIT liter-
ature implies). Additionally, it is clear that not all growth is created equal. Indeed, 
slow growth can be more sustainable than continuous rapid growth, mainly be-
cause if the former is observed after initial stages of capital accumulation, it can 
be symptomatic of inflated growth (through monetary or fiscal stimulus) rather 
than of that underpinned by productivity gains. This is especially true if, as sev-
eral economists have recently proposed in cutting-edge research, it could be lack 
of growth that is the true “natural” state of an economy, not sustained growth 
(Gordon 2012). One can also see, in terms of effects on expectations and invest-
ment, a more deleterious effect on an economy from episodes of rapid growth 
followed by deep contractions: “Start-stop” growth is much more damaging to 
a country than a longer period of slow, yet consistent one, and while the MIT 
literature makes reference to this phenomenon, it fails to pin the blame on the old 
stalwart, (lack of) macroeconomic stability.
2.3. Timing, timing
The second problem related to the MIT is that the definitions for this concept 
are rarely precise and often depend on the specific observer; in fact, using a high-
ly restrictive set of assumptions, Ye and Robertson (2016) note that there are 
really only seven countries that fit a definition of an MIT in their growth paths. 
For example, Israel is believed (as in the World Bank study) to have graduated 
from the middle-income club over the past five decades. However, this country 
had already been on the margin of being high-income: In 1960, its GDP per capita 
was 46% of that of the US. More importantly for the MIT story, Israel’s GDP per 
capita also stagnated through repeated wars and oil embargos (as shown in Fig. 3) 
until the economy underwent a rapid stabilization program in 1985 coupled with 
intense market-oriented reforms. So while Israel “escaped” the MIT, we cannot 
say that the country was very successful in economic growth over most of the pe-
riod discussed. Indeed, it only reached higher levels of growth relatively recently, 
which helped to push it over the bar it had already hovered close to. 
The example of Botswana, also shown in Fig. 3, makes another case for the dif-
ficulty of defining the MIT. Botswana is widely recognized as a growth model for 
developing countries, with GDP per capita that has increased six-fold since its 
initial tentative steps to growth in the late 1980s. Although the country no longer 
belongs to the low middle-income group, the large gap between middle-income 
and high-income countries means that Botswana is to stay in the MIT for decades. 
In fact, this issue of how long it takes to escape the “trap” (Felipe et al., 2012) is 
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one of its most problematic aspects. According to historical data, the difference 
of growth rates between the high-income countries and the middle-income coun-
tries is around 1%, meaning it would take around 70 years for the middle-income 
countries to reach two-thirds of percentage of GDP per capita of the high-income 
countries. To be more specific, if a country’s GDP per capita is 10% of that of 
the US, then it will take it 70 years for its GDP per capita to reach 20% of that of 
the US. Supposing the country’s GDP per capita is around $1,000 (the threshold 
for a middle-income country), then it will take this country 230 years to escape 
the MIT based on previous growth patterns. Whether or not this country is in 
a trap depends on the degree of patience of the observer - what is the amount of 
time that a country “should” graduate to a higher income-level? 
2.4. What about institutions?
Given the lack of uniqueness of the issues involved with the MIT and the nebu-
lous timing issues surrounding the concept, the last reason in our critique of this 
concept is all the more relevant: What factors cause a country to be trapped which 
are distinct from bad policy? What could be done differently to avoid the trap? 
Current theories focus on diminishing technological transfer (the fact that one can 
only free ride off of the developed world’s technology for so long) or a shrinking 
pool of “surplus” labor that leads to excess demand, wage growth, and, inevitably, 
a loss of labor-cost competitiveness (Canuto, 2011). However, these current expla-
nations are very micro-oriented in that they focus on industry-specific issues that 
do not encapsulate the bigger issues surrounding growth slowdowns. 
The biggest issue neglected in prescriptions on overcoming the MIT concept 
deals with the “mezzanine issue” of institutions, the components of the national 
economy that mediate and influence both its macroeconomic and microeconomic 
facets (see Fig. 4). While many papers exploring overcoming the MIT make a brief 
nod to the role of institutions (Kharas and Kholi, 2011; Paus, 2012), the discus-
sion on the whole neglects insights from new institutional economics or, indeed, 
any precision on which “institutions” would be most important. While a country 
institutional structure on the whole can provide incentives for work, accumula-
tion of human and physical capital, technological acquisition, and improved re-
Fig. 3. GDP per capita relative to the US: Israel and Botswana, 1967–2016  
(percent of US GDP per capita, constant 2010 US$).
Source: World Development Indicators, author’s calculations.
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source allocation (Acemoglu et al., 2005), there are specific institutions, political 
and economic, within such a country’s institutional system (Hartwell, 2013). This 
is crucial, as different institutions have different goals; for example, political in-
stitutions tend to be concerned more with distribution of power, while economic 
institutions focus on the distribution of production and resources in society. 
It is these distinctions that also condition the effects of institutions on emerging 
markets and their growth paths. In particular, property rights are perhaps the most 
important economic institution, underpinning all others; as de Soto (2000) notes, 
effective protection of property is necessary for protecting investors, collateral-
izing assets, and establishing the security necessary for higher-order growth. In 
many countries, all three of these institutions are lacking in tandem, as political 
volatility and/or large governments stifle property rights. In other countries, one 
deficiency leads to another; for example, lack of property rights may lead to calls 
for bigger government to protect the populace. But while these institutions are 
uniformly noted as having a direct influence on growth (Hartwell, 2013), the MIT 
literature whistles right past the graveyard of bad institutions. 
3. A most predictable trap
Given that the recent buzz over the MIT hinges on its novelty, the compari-
son with existing theories of economic growth is wounding but not fatal, as are 
the worries about timing (a semantic issue) and the role of poor institutions. 
More difficult to tease out from the MIT concept, however, is how the countries 
that entered into the trap are to exit it. It is here that the MIT suffers its greatest 
loss as a guide for development, as cases often used to prove the trap are in and 
of themselves not unique, nor are their solutions. In particular, the countries of-
ten cited as being caught in the inexplicable trap face the very same policy and 
institutional problems that would predictably lead to their plight. This section 
takes a look at case studies from the BRICS countries to illustrate that the con-
ceptual novelty of the MIT is not actually novel.
3.1. India’s love-hate relationship with growth
The countries that are often cited as examples of the MIT show that even this 
most basic of economic lessons has been ignored around the world (a point made 
by Han and Wei, 2017). India, in particular, offers a cautionary tale of stabili-
zation delayed. The world’s second-largest country by population is located in 
Fig. 4. Mezzanine factors of growth.
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the most disappointing of all regions in terms of its growth over the past 50 years. 
From an abiding faith in socialism and bureaucracy to conflict and natural disas-
ters, India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh have failed to make the leap to high income 
(indeed, Bangladesh is still listed as low-income, with per capita GDP of approxi-
mately US$1.029 in 2016 in constant 2010 US$, according to the World Bank). 
Given the wealth of people, the emphasis on education, and the geographic ad-
vantages of the region, its lack of growth is somewhat stunning. But over the past 
fifty years, India has only seen acceleration of growth when it finally stabilized 
in 1991 but was unable to build upon these gains until a series of more structural 
reforms in the 2000s that allowed for capital accumulation.
After a bloody independence from the British Empire in 1947, India imme-
diately took a path that seemed enticing at the time to many underdeveloped 
countries, into the arms of socialism. The several-decades’ long dalliance with 
a planned economy, including the creation of the “licence raj” (where every ac-
tion in the economy required permission from some bureaucrat) led to “average” 
growth (that is, growth similar to many of its developing-country peers) dur-
ing the 1950s and 1960s (De Long, 2003).4 However, this “average” growth of 
approximately 1.5% per year from 1960 to 1980 meant stagnation in a country 
whose population was increasing at a rate of 2.2% a year during the 1960s and 
early 1970s, especially during times of economic contraction (which India saw 
in 1965–1966, 1971–1972, 1974, 1976, and 1979). The sum total of these poli-
cies meant that India stagnated vis-à-vis the United States (Fig. 5); coupled with 
continued inflation and structural stasis, India did not even break out of the ranks 
of “lower-income” countries until 2007.
4 A key point arguing against DeLong is that, although he claims that the experience of other countries in 
the 1950s and 1960s shows that India’s experience was “normal,” however, this overlooks the tremendous 
advantages India had (as well as the fact that, as DeLong acknowledges, inefficiencies were par for the course 
in the 1950s and 60s, as everyone was experimenting with some form of socialism). To say that India behaved 
as best as it could in its environment (especially, in the manner that DeLong does, to downplay the success of 
economic liberalization in the 1990s) is to perform a gross disservice to the Indian people. 
Fig. 5. GDP per capita relative to the US: India, 1960–2016 
(percent of US GDP per capita).
Source: World Development Indicators, author’s calculations.
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The main reason that India appeared to even reach the plateau of “lower middle 
income” was largely attributable to the economic liberalization that India under-
took in 1991 to finally unleash the power of its natural advantages. As Ahluwalia 
(2002, p. 68) phrased it, “growth in the 1990s was accompanied by remarkable 
external stability despite the east Asian crisis. Poverty also declined significantly 
in the post-reform period and at a faster rate than in the 1980s.” The package of 
reforms from 1991 focused mainly on macroeconomic stability, which had badly 
been shaken by a balance of payments crisis due to increasing levels of debt 
during the 1980s; additionally, there was a liberalization of foreign direct invest-
ment and a slight lowering of tariffs (unfortunately, India’s tariff rates remained 
amongst the highest in the developing world due to the fact that other countries 
reduced their tariff rates much faster during the 1990s).
However, the “take-off” phase of India’s growth was short-lived and has been 
debated by economists. For example, research by DeLong (2003) but also from 
Rodrik and Subramanian (2004) for the IMF showed that one of the key traits 
cited in the MIT literature, TFP, actually started to increase during the debt-rid-
den 1980s rather than during the 1990s (according to the IMF, TFP did grow in 
the 1990s, but at a slower pace, put at some estimates from 2.89% in the 1980s 
to 2.44 % annually in the 1990s). Rodrik and Subramanian (2005) also show that 
the TFP growth in the 1980s was due to a “pro-business” orientation of the Indian 
government, which resulted in gains for specific favored companies that filtered 
through the economy because the country was already so far away from the in-
come possibility frontier. As in our discussion of growth models above, in an 
environment riddled with distortions, removing even one (and in a half-hearted 
manner) can have dividends. 
These dividends continued into the 1990s, but diminishing marginal returns 
were already catching up and by the second half of the 1990s, growth had slowed 
again. Tariff rates increased an average of 10 percent from 1997–2002 as second-
order reforms, such as labor market flexibility, remained untouched; coupled with 
the lack of infrastructure, India’s growth began to once again return to “normal” 
levels… except in the 1990s, and especially with the example of China rising, 
these rates were anything but normal (Ahluwalia, 2002). The slowdown in India 
from its promising pick-up in such a short period of time led to much hand-wring-
ing and a loud chorus that the “neoliberal” policies of the “Washington consensus” 
had failed (Buckley, 2009), even though India had avoided many of the policies 
that made up the “Consensus” and were hands-off on any real structural reform 
(indeed, government spending increased over 10 percent a year from 1997–2000). 
Over the last ten years, as noted above, India has finally climbed into the “mid-
dle income” category, with a very unique and odd path that somewhat contra-
dicts the MIT literature: as just noted, TFP grew in the 1980s and slightly slowly 
in the 1990s, but this was not coupled with an increase in capital accumulation, 
which should have predated the productivity gains (Bosworth and Collins, 2008). 
However, just as TFP was beginning to slow, further reforms unleashed increasing 
amounts of investment (from 20–25% of GDP in 2000 to a high of 39.6% of GDP 
in 2011) which have driven India’s growth rate upwards of 8 percent a year, with 
catch-up rates relative to the US second only to those of East Asia (see Fig. 5). India 
may thus have put the cart before the elephant in achieving what it has to this point, 
and only now may actually see the growth slowdown predicted by both the Solow 
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model and the MIT. This is likely, given that many commentators have noted that, 
while India’s capital accumulation has been impressive, the country is suffering 
from backsliding on macroeconomic stability (in particular in regard to inflation 
and fiscal policy) under flamboyant Prime Minister Modi, as well as neglecting 
to tackle the still-dismal state of the business environment (Escaleras and Chiang, 
2017). Regardless, India’s performance will continue to mystify in years to come.5
3.2. South Africa’s self-made trap
No region perhaps typifies the tired conceptual problem with the MIT than 
Africa which, admittedly, has mostly been caught in an “underdevelopment trap.” 
As shown in the last section and in the introduction, the region that, on the aggre-
gate, had the worst growth performance over the past 50 years was  sub-Saharan 
Africa. In contrast to East Asia, which had several high-flying performers stag-
gered over the entire period, or Eastern Europe and Central Asia, which saw 
boom-bust periods, SSA saw only one recognized success story (Botswana) and 
countless failures. These failures have not just been regular problems of growth 
slowdowns — they have been spectacular: according to the World Bank, Liberia’s 
per capita GDP in 1996 (in constant US$2000) was a near-invisible $58 ($30 
lower than China directly preceding the Cultural Revolution in 1964), while 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) has failed to post a per capita GDP 
higher than $100 for its entire existence.
However, the raison d’être of the MIT argument is not that some countries 
grow while others do not; it is that some countries start to grow then stall. Thus, 
for our purposes, countries that have never grown, such as DRC and Liberia 
(and, indeed, the vast majority of African countries), are less interesting in re-
gards to the MIT than those that have and no longer do. However, these countries 
are harder to find in SSA, as most African countries either have not yet attained 
the US$1,000 per capita GDP threshold, or have been as (again) Botswana, which 
has grown by an average of 4.81% since attaining the US$1,000 per capita GDP 
threshold and 3% since it crossed the MIT threshold of US$3,000 per capita. 
A better example of the middle income trap is Gabon, which saw its per capita 
GDP peak in 1976 at $8,594 but declined precipitously over the next ten years to 
settle in the US$4,300 range (where it has been since 1997). Namibia also meets 
the criteria, although it reached the “stall” threshold a bit sooner than most: after 
attaining a per capita GDP of $2,263 in 1980, the country saw its standard of liv-
ing decline and then slightly rebound, reaching a GDP per capita in 2016 that is 
merely 21% above its 1980 level. 
But it is perhaps Namibia’s large and well-known neighbor, South Africa, 
which has shown the most signs of the MIT. As Fig. 6 shows, per capita GDP 
5 An interesting corollary to India’s growth tale comes not from Indians living in India, but from the Indian 
diaspora, which may show how the country’s human capital has great potential. Mauritius and Comoros are 
countries that are similar in terms of their resource endowments, population, and size, but Mauritius is much 
wealthier than Comoros; indeed, in 2011, the per capita GDP of Mauritius was 13 times that of Comoros 
(which has seen growth contract in recent years). Similarly, Trinidad and Tobago, in comparison to other 
Caribbean countries, has a much higher GDP level. The common denominator may be that Mauritius and 
Trinidad and Tobago have a significant fraction of Indian descendants, much higher than other countries in 
their respective regions. While not conclusive proof, this correlation may show that the human capital basis 
exists in India for growth, it is just the need for appropriate institutions that is holding it back.
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growth in South Africa has been quite variable over the past 50 years, neither 
falling below US$2,200 nor quite reaching US$4,000. After impressive gains into 
the early 1980s, growth tapered off and then receded as international sanctions on 
the apartheid regime increased. Growth haltingly resumed after apartheid’s fall in 
1994, but per capita GDP only reached 1981 levels by 2006; moreover, the over-
all state of the economy had taken a turn for the worse, with a worryingly high 
unemployment rate that continues to be among the highest in the world (fluctuat-
ing between 25 and 32% from 2000 to 2016). 
The reasons for this growth slowdown were attributed by Rodrik (2008) to 
a decline in the relative profitability of manufacturing in the country throughout 
the 1990s, although other observers have noted that the persistent unemployment 
is due to the power of unions in the South African economy (and their wage-
setting power far above market-clearing rates). An IMF examination from 2009, 
using both a GDP and a growth accounting framework, notes that the real culprit 
has been sluggish investment: “The difference in TFP (including fewer skills)… 
seems to explain part of the growth gap, but it is less striking than the gap in in-
vestment” (Eyraud, 2009, p. 8). 
Of course, all of these explanations are probably true to some extent and 
more a question of sequencing than anything else: Manufacturing would be 
less profitable due to union power, and a sector in decline would be less likely 
to attract much investment. However, these explanations miss a key issue in 
South Africa’s growth, and that was that the country itself retained many of its 
sanctions after the international community had let them go; that is, while in 
1994, the country underwent a series of trade liberalization reforms, it never 
went all the way in liberalizing. As of 2009, the country’s average tariff rate was 
still twice the European Union’s, with the tariff structure distributed through-
out the economy and few goods spared (Freytag, 2011) noted that the most pro-
tected goods are concentrated in low-tech industries). Similarly, administrative 
delays and bureaucracy at the border are epidemic in South Africa, as the coun-
try is ranked 147 (out of 189) in the 2018 World Bank Doing Business “trading 
across borders” sub-category. It appears that South Africa took its protectionism 
as exogenously determined and still has yet to rid itself of the chains imposed 
upon it by the world during the days of apartheid. Indeed, in many ways, it has 
embraced it. 
Fig. 6. GDP per capita growth in South Africa, 1960–2016 (constant 2010 US$).
Source: World Development Indicators.
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3.3. Property rights: a transition to growth for Russia and the former 
Soviet Union?
As noted above, in the economic literature, the importance of “good” institu-
tions for growth has been widely recognized: These fundamental goals of creat-
ing correct incentives are what makes an institution “good,” and one of the key 
institutions that comes under the heading of “good” is the broad-based institution 
of economic freedom.
The former communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the for-
mer Soviet Union, and above all one of the driving forces of the BRICS, Russia, 
are perhaps the states with the most interesting growth paths — paths that show 
the importance of proper institutions. With the fall of the Soviet Union at the end 
of 1991, a wave of hope surged throughout the region that growth and democra-
tization would be soon forthcoming. With the hindsight of 20 years of indepen-
dence, however, while both occurred in Central and Eastern Europe, the reality 
is that neither really occurred in the Central Asian successor states. Indeed, it is 
questionable if the Central Asian states “transitioned” at all economically or po-
litically, given that Kazakhstan has the same leader it had during the last days of 
the Soviet Union, and the other two have seen two coups (Kyrgyzstan) and a cult 
of personality to rival that of Stalin or Mao (Turkmenistan). In reality, much of 
Central Asia has moved to independence but not really “transitioned.”
This does not mean that there has not been growth, although the Soviet appara-
tus has been dismantled in some countries more than in others. As just noted , there 
has been a substantial divergence between the countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe (CEE) and those that actually were a part of the Soviet Union in growth 
paths: As Fig. 7 shows, the CEE countries recovered earlier in terms of absolute 
GDP growth from their transformational recession (in the words of Kornai 1994) 
and grew faster afterwards than the former Soviet Union (FSU) in the first de-
cade of transition. As several authors have noted, the recovery in CEE was due 
mainly to their more advanced institutions, as well as the advancement of policy 
Fig. 7. GDP per capita growth in transition economies, 1992–2016 (annual % growth).
Note: Country grouping definitions are taken from the OECD, with the exception that CEE does not include 
the Baltics, who are separated out.
Source: World Development Indicators; author’s calculations. 
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reforms that was much farther along than in the CIS countries (as well as the com-
paratively smaller extent of heavy industrialization that characterized the Soviet 
Union and its republics, see Hartwell 2013). The takeoff of growth in the FSU 
from 2000 onward was puzzling, however, even when accounting for the energy 
sectors — mainly because the FSU did not see the same sort of institutional ad-
vancement that the CEE countries did. The reason for this may be attributable, 
as Havrylyshyn (2008) notes, to the fact that by 2000, the FSU countries had 
achieved the same level of institutional development as the CEE countries had be-
fore transition began (see Table); thus, a “minimum threshold” was reached that al-
lowed for the fast-growth portion of their journey to begin. This is consistent with 
India’s experience mentioned above, where an economy that was so riddled with 
distortions that it had incredible marginal gains upon finally seeing a loosening up 
of restrictions, even without the institutions necessary to reach sustained growth. 
In terms of institutional development in the FSU, in many countries only a bare 
minimum of important economic institutions are in place. For example, the most 
important economic institution of all, property rights, has shown remarkable re-
silience against improvement: According to the Heritage Foundation’s sub-index 
of property rights, on a scale of 1 to 100 (with higher numbers indicating bet-
ter protection of property rights), the highest non-Baltic former Soviet repub-
lics in 2016 were Moldova and Georgia, each with a score of 40. Moreover, 
not only have property rights not been protected, their status has worsened in 
the FSU  almost immediately since the basics of the transformation were com-
plete (Fig. 8). Coupled with this decline in basic property rights has been stasis 
in many other institutions, including the development of an independent judi-
ciary and basic labor market institutions. By nearly every institutional metric, 
the countries of the FSU score lower than the CEE countries, with only the Baltic 
countries the exception, and Russia often leading the decline.
This explanation of developing, but by no means developed, institutions as 
the reason for growth in the past decade is also consistent with the performance 
of the FSU countries in the wake of the global financial crisis, who have suffered 
somewhat more than the CEE countries. With economies based more on primary 
commodities and natural resources, the FSU countries are more susceptible to 
price swings such as those that hit the world in 2008–2009 or the fall in the price 
Table
Heritage Index of Economic Freedom scores, CEE in 1995 v. FSU in 2000.
CEE countries 1995 FSU countries 2000
Romania 42.85 Turkmenistan 37.60
Albania 49.68 Uzbekistan 38.13
Bulgaria 50.03 Belarus 41.29
Poland 50.70 Tajikistan 44.83
Hungary 55.22 Ukraine 47.81
Slovakia 60.36 Azerbaijan 49.83
Estonia 65.25 Kazakhstan 50.35





Source: Heritage Foundation. Index of Economic Freedom, various years.
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of oil since 2014; thus, the growth experience that had started suddenly ground 
to a halt when the rest of the world pulled back its demand for commodities. 
They also, however, have had something to fall back on when the world economy 
picked up steam again: As Fig. 9 shows, of the three largest economies of the FSU, 
Russia and Kazakhstan rebounded relatively quickly from the crisis but were hit 
by commodity price slumps and economic stagnation (coupled with sanctions) 
from 2013 onward. Conversely, Ukraine, without the oil reserves of Russia or 
Kazakhstan, faced a slump of its own making, as institutional stagnation has been 
replaced by institutional uncertainty in a post-Maidan Kyiv. Whereas Russia and 
Kazakhstan still see problems with corruption, bureaucracy, and quasi-market in-
stitutions, their energy reserves have been able to sustain capital inflows. Ukraine 
has not had that blessing.
Fig. 8. Decreasing property rights in the FSU, 1995–2016 
(Heritage Index of Economic Freedom “property rights” score).
Note: FSU includes Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan.
Source: Heritage Index of Property Rights; author’s calculations.
Fig. 9. GDP per capita relative to the US: major post-Soviet economies 
(percent of US GDP per capita, constant 2010 US$).
Source: World Development Indicators; author’s calculations.
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This reality of resource dependence and minor institutional change may provide 
the key for the past and future of growth in the Commonwealth of Independent 
States (CIS). It appears that just enough structural reform was done internally to 
unleash the power of “rapid” growth; coupled with the boom in energy prices, 
the countries of the FSU saw the capital accumulation they needed to take them 
through to middle-income status. Indeed, according to official statistics, Russia 
and Kazakhstan have not been in the low-income category since independence, 
while Ukraine has moved between categories a few times and finally ensconced 
in the middle-income category again in 2006. However, even though absolute 
growth rates may have been relatively higher in the FSU over the past decade, 
the degree of convergence with developed economies has been maddeningly 
slow, as can also be seen in Fig. 9 for the three largest economies of the CIS. Even 
with the bounce of recovery after the global crisis, Russia’s per capita GDP is still 
only slightly above a quarter of that of the US, while Ukraine’s is not even 10% 
(for a country 1/6th the size of the US in terms of population). Thus, if the MIT is 
real, the FSU countries may not have even encountered it yet, as they have only 
just put themselves on a “normal” growth path. If other countries examined above 
have proven any clues, the slow growth of institutions in the FSU may mean that 
it is here and now that problems will multiply in regard to sustaining growth. 
4. Conclusions 
This paper has attempted to take a deeper look at the “middle-income trap,” 
note the issues with its current formulation, and, more importantly, isolate 
commonalities across BRICS countries that have stalled in their growth. From 
the analysis presented in the previous sections, two major lessons can be learned 
from the BRICS experience:
4.1. The fundamentals still matter
Macroeconomic stability may not be sufficient to prevent a growth slowdown, but 
just because some level of growth has been achieved, it does not mean it is time to 
throw out macroeconomic stability as a policy goal. Simply put, macroeconomic sta-
bility is necessary at all levels of development, and governments are advised to keep 
their eyes on maintaining macroeconomic stability (especially in regards to inflation) 
at all times. Even growth that has been achieved can be wiped out by just one experi-
ence of high levels of inflation, and thus, in order to avoid the MIT, macroeconomic 
stability (including fiscal prudence) must be adhered to. This includes avoiding in-
flationary temptations (unlike Argentina, Turkey, and other countries that have fallen 
into the trap), while keeping the overall size of government low (as in Poland and 
Estonia). The experience of Russia continues to prove this, as difficulties inherent in 
economic transition were a huge macroeconomic shock that, once calmed down, led 
to growth, but repeated economic troubles (such as the currency crisis in 1998) and 
reliance on primary commodities (since 2008) have kept growth in check. 
Recognition of this reality is even more crucial given the experience of devel-
oped countries during and following the global financial crisis, where it appeared 
that the “old rules did not apply,” and stimulus spending was injected without 
a thought as to the consequences in inflation, asset bubbles, and fiscal prudence. 
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With continued sluggish growth in the OECD (led by the United States, which 
has an open-ended fiscal and monetary commitment to growth stabilization, if not 
macroeconomic stabilization), the dangers of macroeconomic instability are even 
more pronounced. Emerging markets, which do not generally have the luxury of 
a large market or attractiveness to Chinese investors, would be cautioned to avoid 
the policy moves currently on display in the developed countries; perhaps emu-
lating the OECD countries would be the easiest way to make an emerging market 
fragile, and thus more prone to being stuck in the MIT.
The other common thread in these periods of macroeconomic stability is that 
they were all home-grown, that is directly resulting from policies consciously 
enacted in the particular country and not imposed by outside conditions or ac-
tors. Of course, a case can be made for emerging markets specifically that some 
instability can be imported; given their small size on the world stage and the fact 
that they are mostly price-takers and not price-makers, they can be susceptible to 
larger macroeconomic conditions. However, it has also been the most open coun-
tries that have seen the most consistent growth patterns upward. 
While trade may not necessarily “create” growth, being a second-order effect of 
economic activity (there must be investment and production before there is anything 
to trade), the attitudes toward it are a signal of a government’s commitment to free 
and open economic policies. East Asian countries have been successful in achieving 
high and sustained rates of economic growth since the early 1960s because of their 
free-market, outward-oriented economies (World Bank 1993). As many of the theo-
retical justifications for the middle-income trap note, the first stage of a country’s de-
velopment relies on basic manufactures and reverse engineering, importing existing 
technology and adapting it so that countries may escape being low-income. To set 
this in motion, a country must necessarily be open to trade to acquire the basic tech-
nologies. However, openness to trade only grows more important as a country devel-
ops; as diminishing returns to technology set in, Agénor and Canuto’s (2015) over-
lapping generations model shows that a critical mass is required (but never reached) 
to draw highly-skilled workers into higher-skilled manufacturing. Openness to trade 
could provide this demand that is missing in the home country market, contributing 
to creating the critical mass to reorient a country’s labor force towards higher skills 
(and, with it, provide sustainable technological growth). 
On the other hand, trade protection and avoidance of competition is a one-way 
ticket to underdevelopment, mainly because a) trade restrictions shrink the mar-
ket for producers in a particular country to the domestic market, b) restrictions 
often bring a whole host of other distortions with them (including the creation 
of trade-licensing bureaucracies and corruption), and c) a country that closes it-
self off to trade often pursues other growth-dampening policies as well (that is, 
trade restrictions are rarely the only distortion a government imposes). Too many 
BRICS countries continue to cling to ideas of import substitution and govern-
ment-directed industrialization instead. Due to India’s “Fabian socialism” and 
license regime for any sort of international transaction, the country stayed on an 
incredibly slow growth path for decades, only seeing an improved trajectory once 
it began to liberalize its trade. South Africa remains another powerful example of 
this, as do most of the FSU countries (led by Russia, who is famous for weapon-
izing trade). Thus, closing off a country behind protectionist walls means cutting 
off a country’s economy from potential consumers that can drive growth.
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4.2. Institutions are necessary… political and economic
A key thread running through our examination the BRICS countries (echoing 
Doner and Schneider 2016) was the extent of institutional development and how 
institutions evolve. In the first instance, the growth of government is often a sign 
that a growth slowdown is imminent; that is, government tends to grow as an 
economy grows (there is more of a pie to distribute, and government services 
are demanded by richer citizens), but this same growth often leads to crowd-
ing out of private investment and a diminution of the same entrepreneurial spir-
it that sparked growth in the first place. India is an important example of this 
phenomenon, as its first tentative steps towards liberalization in the 1990s were 
strangled in the cradle by a concurrent burst of government growth. Its only sus-
tainable growth path occurred once government contracted in the late 1990s, and 
even then it resumed growth only in the mid-2000s. Across all BRICS countries, 
govern ment remains a large part of the economy, growing at an average of 4.55% 
per year (Fig. 10), a problem for future growth prospects.
This remains a problem because, as our examination of Russia showed, policies 
that encourage the growth of market-oriented economic institutions should be pur-
sued, a reality which is difficult to find in an environment of continued government 
intervention. The most important economic institution would be property rights, 
coupled with other business environment reforms that can help these institutions to 
emerge and thrive. As shown in our analysis of the FSU transition economies, many 
of these crucial “good” economic institutions are still lacking, while time has been 
spent on “bad” institutions: A key example of this is the power of labor unions in 
South Africa, who have created labor market rigidities that stymied the internal real-
location of labor needed to respond flexibly to changing market conditions. Other 
countries, urged on by economists such as Joseph Stiglitz, have also focused on “bad” 
institutions that do not contribute to growth, such as tax administration, at the exclu-
sion of other expenditures that could have aided growth. The evidence is ample that 
property rights are more necessary for sustained growth and should be prioritized. 
Fig. 10. Growth of government in the BRICS, 1992–2016 (% p. a.).
Source: World Development Indicators; author’s calculations.
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In making this assertion, we come back to the reality that exotic solutions to 
the MIT are not necessary. As always, it appears that economies need to focus on 
the fundamentals, a prescription which is too often lacking nowadays. But it is 
the only way to escape any MIT. 
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